Based on the lesson and readings for this week, there is an opportunity for significant oversight of the
intelligence community (IC). Due to the annual intelligence authorization bill, Congress has the power to
establish the IC’s budget and approve the programs that it can run. This could give them significant
leverage over the IC to cut budget or programs if Congress felt that the IC was performing in a way that
did not meet their standards or the nation’s needs (Martinez, 2020). Additionally, the president is required
to provide Congress with a presidential finding at least forty eight hours prior to covert action for their
authorization. In order to involve the judicial branch in oversight and provide an outside perspective to a
closed community, federal judges do not need to have a security clearance in order to review classified
information (Manget, 2007).
However, there are several loopholes that make the oversight of the IC extremely difficult. Although the
annual intelligence authorization bill provides Congress with the primary budget and program authorization
for the IC, the Appropriations Committee may fund activities that are not expressly authorized by the bill.
Rosenbach and Peritz argue that this may be due to the fact that the Appropriations Committee does not
have the same depth of knowledge on the IC as Congress does and do not see as much of a need for
rigorous oversight (2009). In regards to presidential findings, the president may choose to limit the
information solely to the Gang of Eight in extraordinary circumstances. The vagueness of this language
lends itself to potential misuse (Martinez, 2020). Policies like the PATRIOT Act, Freedom of Information Act,
and the Privacy act further complicate transparency between the IC and its overseers. Ultimately, the true
level of oversight is extremely dependent on the interest of the overseer to follow through on their
responsibilities. Whenever there is a scandal or intelligence failure, there is a tremendous push to maintain,
and at times reform, oversight of the IC (Johnson, 2007). However when the failures and successes of the
IC are not in the public eye, interest declines again.